

Formal and Incremental Verification of SysML Specifications for the Design of Component-Based Systems

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Outline







3 Contributions













- 2 Scientific Context
- 3 Contributions
- 4 Conclusion and Perspectives





Context

Development of Systems by Component Assembly

- Reduce complexity
- Reduce development costs
- Improve reliability

Functional Requirements

Functional properties that the system must satisfy to fulfill user needs

SysML

Complex systems, communicate, popular







Context

Component-Based Systems (CBS)

- Components described by their interfaces
- Simple and composite components
- Built by assembling the components
- Architecture described by the connections between the components
- Leads to big systems (complex)








How to formally ensure reliability of CBS described by SysML?





Contributions







A Car Safety System



Airbag and seat-belts protecting passenger lives



Oscar Carrillo Formal and Incremental Verification...



Outline



Introduction

- 2 Scientific Context
 - The SysML Language
 Interface automata

3 Contributions

4 Conclusion and Perspectives






The SysML Language

Systems Modeling Language

- Model hardware and software systems
- Functional and non-functional requirements
- Interdisciplinary
- SysML is a communication method, not a methodology








Interface Automata [Alfaro, Henzinger 2001]

Definition

An interface automaton A is represented by the tuple $\langle S, I, \Sigma^{I}, \Sigma^{O}, \Sigma^{H}, \delta \rangle$ such as :

- S is a finite set of states,
- I ⊆ S is a finite set of initial states,
- ► Σ^{I}, Σ^{O} and Σ^{H} , respectively denote the sets of input, output and internal actions. $\Sigma_{A} = \Sigma^{I} \cup \Sigma^{O} \cup \Sigma^{H}$,
- $\delta \subseteq S \times \Sigma \times S$ is the set of transitions between two states.







Interface automata synchronized product

Definition

Let A_1 and A_2 two composable interface automata. The synchronized product $A_1 \otimes A_2$ of A_1 and A_2 is defined by :


$$\begin{array}{l} \triangleright \ S_{A_1 \otimes A_2} = S_{A_1} \times S_{A_2} \ \text{and} \ I_{A_1 \otimes A_2} = I_{A_1} \times I_{A_2}; \\ \triangleright \ \Sigma^I_{A_1 \otimes A_2} = (\Sigma^I_{A_1} \cup \Sigma^I_{A_2}) \ \setminus \ Shared(A_1, A_2); \\ \triangleright \ \Sigma^O_{A_1 \otimes A_2} = (\Sigma^O_{A_1} \cup \Sigma^O_{A_2}) \ \setminus \ Shared(A_1, A_2); \\ \triangleright \ \Sigma^H_{A_1 \otimes A_2} = \Sigma^H_{A_1} \cup \Sigma^H_{A_2} \ \cup \ Shared(A_1, A_2); \\ \bullet \ ((s_1, s_2), a, (s'_1, s'_2)) \in \delta_{A_1 \otimes A_2} \ \text{if} \\ \bullet \ a \notin Shared(A_1, A_2) \land (s_1, a, s'_1) \in \delta_{A_1} \land s_2 = s'_2 \\ \bullet \ a \notin Shared(A_1, A_2) \land (s_2, a, s'_2) \in \delta_{A_2} \land s_1 = s'_1 \end{array}$$

$$\bullet \ a \in Shared(A_1, A_2) \land (s_1, a, s_1) \in \delta_{A_1} \land (s_2, a, s_2) \in \delta_{A_2}.$$





Interface automata synchronized product







Illegal states


Definition

Let two composable interface automata A_1 and A_2 , the set of illegal states $Illegal(A_1, A_2) \subseteq S_{A_1} \times S_{A_2}$ is defined by

 $\{(s_1, s_2) \in S_{A_1} \times S_{A_2} \mid \exists a \in Shared(A_1, A_2) \, . \, C\}$

where C is :

 $C = (a \in \Sigma^O_{A_1}(s_1) \land a \not\in \Sigma^I_{A_2}(s_2)) \lor (a \in \Sigma^O_{A_2}(s_2) \land a \not\in \Sigma^I_{A_1}(s_1))$








Composition

Definition

The composition $A_1 \parallel A_2$ of two IA A_1 and A_2 is defined by : (i) $S_{A_1 \parallel A_2} = Comp(A_1, A_2)$, (ii) $I_{A_1 \parallel A_2} = I_{A_1 \otimes A_2} \cap Comp(A_1, A_2)$ (iii) $\delta_{A_1 \parallel A_2} = \delta_{A_1 \otimes A_2} \cap Comp(A_1, A_2) \times \Sigma_{A_1 \parallel A_2} \times Comp(A_1, A_2)$ Where $Comp(A_1, A_2) = A_1 \otimes A_2 - Illegal(A_1, A_2)$



Compatibility

Two interface automata A_1 and A_2 are compatibles if and only if their composition $A_1 \parallel A_2$ has at least one reachable state.



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Outline



2 Scientific Context

3 Contributions

• Incremental Refinement of a CBS Architecture


- Formal Verification of SysML Requirements
- Incremental Specification of CBS Architecture

4 Conclusion and Perspectives





Incremental Refinement of a CBS Architecture






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Introduction Scientific Context Contributions Conclusion and Perspectives . CBS Architecture Refinement

Overview



Refinement by decomposition


Structural and behavioral refinement relation.



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Refinement Process





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
Formal and Incremental Verification...



CBS Specification with SysML 1.3

Block Definition Diagram (BDD)

Structure of abstract system








CBS Specification with SysML 1.3

Block Definition Diagram (BDD)

Description of SensorsControl block








CBS Specification with SysML 1.3

Block Definition Diagram (BDD)

Proposed decomposition for abstract block.








CBS Specification with SysML 1.3

Internal Block Diagram (IBD)

Proposed internal structure for abstract block








Formal SysML Specification

Definition : SysML Block

Let SB a set of blocks modeled with a BDD, a SysML block B in SBis a tuple $\langle \Phi_B, P_{in}, P_{out}, TypePort \rangle$, where :

- Φ_B is the set of the private operations in B,
- P_{in} the unique input port of B,
- *P_{out}* the unique output port of *B*.
- ► TypePort : P_{in} ∪ P_{out} → SB determines the interface that types each port.








Formal SysML Specification

Definition : SysML IBD

A SysML IBD, of a composite block, is a tuple

 $\langle \Phi Parts, iP_{in}, iP_{out}, eP_{in}, eP_{out}, Connector \rangle$, where :

- $\Phi Parts$ is the set of parts,
- ▶ *iP_{in}* and *iP_{out}* are the sets of internal input and output ports,
- eP_{in} and eP_{out} are the external input and output ports,
- Connector : P_{in} ∪ P_{out} → P_{in} ∪ P_{out} associates input and output ports to other input and output ports.







Structural Refinement

Definition : Structural refinement of SysML blocks

Let B be an abstract block described with the BDD, and IBD_B the internal block diagram of B. Let $B_1, ..., B_n$ be the set of blocks composing B according to the BDD, so $B_1, ..., B_n$ refine structurally B iff :

- $B_1, ..., B_n$ are consistent with B,
- ► the interacting blocks B₁,..., B_n according to IBD_B are compatible.






Consistency Verification

Condition 1 (Composability)

For every pair of connected sub-blocks $\{B_i, B_j\}$, it holds that : $\Phi_{inBi} \cap \Phi_{inBj} = \Phi_{outBi} \cap \Phi_{outBj} = \Phi_{Bi} \cap (\Phi_{Bj} \cup \Phi_{inBj} \cup \Phi_{outBj}) = \Phi_{Bj} \cap (\Phi_{Bi} \cup \Phi_{inBi} \cup \Phi_{outBi}) = \emptyset$








Consistency Verification

Condition 2 (At least same inputs)

For a sub-block B_i connected to the external input port eP_{in} it holds that : $\Phi_{inB} \subseteq \Phi_{inBi}$








Consistency Verification

Condition 3 (At most same outputs)

For a sub-block B_i connected to the external port eP_{out} it holds that : $\Phi_{outBi} \subseteq \Phi_{outB}$.







Compatibility Verification

Interface Automata Generation

Obtained by applying [Chouali *et al.* 2011] approach, from sequence diagrams.

Condition 4 (Compatibility)

Two connected sub-blocks B_1 and B_2 are compatible if their interface automata A_1 and A_2 are compatible.

Ptolemy II [Barais et al. 2005]

Verification module for interface automata composition





Behavioral Refinement

- Let P = A₁ || ... || A_n, be the composite automaton of the composition of a set of blocks B₁, ..., B_n
- \blacktriangleright Let Q be the interface automaton for an abstract block B

Definition : Interface Automata Refinement [Alfaro et al. 2005]

An interface automaton P refines an interface automaton Q, written $P\leq_a Q,$ if

- 1. $\Sigma_Q^I \subseteq \Sigma_P^I$ and $\Sigma_Q^O \supseteq \Sigma_P^O$
- 2. there is an alternating simulation \leq_a by Q of P such that $I_P \leq_a I_Q$







Behavioral Refinement

Definition : Alternating Simulation [Alfaro et al. 2005]

For a pair of interface automata $P = \langle S_P, I_P, \Sigma_P^I, \Sigma_P^O, \Sigma_P^H, \delta_P \rangle$ and $Q = \langle S_Q, I_Q, \Sigma_Q^I, \Sigma_Q^O, \Sigma_Q^H, \delta_Q \rangle$ with the same signature, a binary relation $\leq_a \subseteq S_P \times S_Q$ is an alternating simulation if whenever $p \leq_a q$ and $a \in \Sigma_P$ it holds that :

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{if } q \xrightarrow{a?} q' \text{ and } a \in \Sigma_Q^I \text{ then } \exists p'.p \xrightarrow{a?} p' \text{ and } (p',q') \in \leq_a \\ \text{if } p \xrightarrow{a!} p' \text{ and } a \in \Sigma_P^O \text{ then } \exists q'.q \xrightarrow{\tau}^* q'. \exists q''.q' \xrightarrow{a!}^* q'' \text{ and} \\ (p',q'') \in \leq_a \\ \text{if } p \xrightarrow{a;} p' \text{ and } a \in \Sigma_P^H \text{ then } \exists q'.q \xrightarrow{\tau}^* q' \text{ and } (p',q') \in \leq_a \end{array}$$











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



Behavioral Refinement

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$$\begin{array}{l} \text{if } q \stackrel{a?}{\longrightarrow} q' \text{ and } a \in \Sigma_Q^I \text{ then } \exists p'.p \stackrel{a?}{\longrightarrow} p' \text{ and } (p',q') \in \leq_a \\ \text{if } p \stackrel{a!}{\longrightarrow} p' \text{ and } a \in \Sigma_P^O \text{ then } \exists q'.q \stackrel{\tau}{\longrightarrow}^* q'. \exists q''.q' \stackrel{a!}{\longrightarrow}^* q'' \text{ and } \\ (p',q'') \in \leq_a \\ \text{if } p \stackrel{a;}{\longrightarrow} p' \text{ and } a \in \Sigma_P^H \text{ then } \exists q'.q \stackrel{\tau}{\longrightarrow}^* q' \text{ and } (p',q') \in \leq_a \end{array}$$









MIO Workbench [Bauer et al. 2010]

Modal automaton

- Larsen et al. 2007
- ► A modal automaton S is a six tuple : $S = (S_S, I_S, \Sigma_S^{ext}, \Sigma_S^H, \longrightarrow_{\Diamond}^S, \longrightarrow_{\Box}^S)$

$$\mathcal{T}(S_P, I_P, \Sigma_P^I, \Sigma_P^O, \Sigma_P^H, \delta_P) = (S_S, I_S, \Sigma_S^{ext}, \Sigma_S^H, \longrightarrow_{\Diamond}, \longrightarrow_{\Box})$$


Alternating simulation and observational modal refinement

Alternating simulation and observational modal refinement coincide for interface automata in the following sense : For any two interface automata P, Q : $P \leq_a Q$ iff $\mathcal{T}(P) \leq_m^* \mathcal{T}(Q)$





MIO Workbench





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Formal and Incremental Verification...



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• Incremental Refinement of a CBS Architecture

• Formal Verification of SysML Requirements


• Incremental Specification of CBS Architecture

④ Conclusion and Perspectives





Formal Verification of SysML Requirements






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Requirements for a Car Safety System



Requirements Refinement for a Safety System




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Case Study

Sensors Requirements

Always get the sensor values and send them to the ACU.







From SD to Promela


SD element	Promela Element	Promela Statement
Lifeline	Process	<pre>proctype{}</pre>
Message	Message	<pre>mtype{m1,,mn}</pre>
Connector	Communication channel for each message arrow	<pre>chan chanName = [1] of {mtype}</pre>
Send and receive events	Send and receive operations	$Send \Rightarrow \mathtt{ab!m}, Receive \Rightarrow \mathtt{ab?m}$
Alt combined frag-	if condition	if
ment		::(guard)->ab_p?p;
		:: else -> ab_q?q;
		fi;
Loop combined	do operator	do
fragment		::ab_p?p;
		od
Mapping of basic concepts from Sequence Diagrams to Promela		

Lima *et al.* 2009





Sensors block Promela description







Verification with SPIN

Promela description must keep track of who is sending/receiving what message at any time of the execution.

Flags for sensor component

- send, receive
- msg_get_sensor_values, msg_send_sensor_values
- sensors, environment
- All flags updated by d_step

LTL Property with flags

 $\label{eq:constraint} \begin{array}{l} \square \mbox{(sensors \&\& receive \&\& msg_get_sensor_values)} \rightarrow \\ \diamondsuit \mbox{ (sensors \&\& send \&\& msg_sensor_values))} \end{array}$





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
- Incremental Refinement of a CBS Architecture
- Formal Verification of SysML Requirements
- Incremental Specification of CBS Architecture








Incremental Specification of CBS Architecture







Approach Steps






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Requirements for a Car Safety System



Requirements Refinement for a Safety System



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


Requirement Diagram Analysis

Definition : Requirement diagram specification

We specify a SysML requirement diagram by $RD=\langle IR,SR,RelC,RelD\rangle$ such that :

- ► *IR* : define the set of initial requirements,
- SR : the set of all requirements.
- ▶ $RelC \subseteq SR \times P(SR)$ the relation of containment, where P(SR) is the set of the subsets of SR.
- $RelD \subseteq SR \times P(SR)$ the relation of derivation.





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Formal and Incremental Verification...



Atomic Requirements

Definition : Atomic requirements

The set of atomic requirements in the requirement diagram specified by $RD = \langle IR, SR, RelC, RelD \rangle$ is the set $AR = \{R | R \in SR, \nexists(R, \{R_i, ..., R_n\}) \in RelC\}$

Theorem : System satisfying all atomic requirements

Let S be a CBS, let $RD = \langle IR, SR, RelC, RelD \rangle$ be the specification of a requirement diagram, and let AR be the set of atomic requirements of RD. S satisfies all the requirements in SR iff it satisfies the atomic requirements AR.





Atomic Requirements in Case Study

R1.1.1 : Sensors

Always get the sensor values and send them to the ACU.

 $\Box \texttt{((sensors \&\& receive \&\& msg_get_sensor_values)} \rightarrow \\$

 \Diamond (sensors && send && msg_sensor_values))

R1.1.2 : Airbag Control Unit

Decide whether or not to deploy the airbag and/or lock the seat-belts once the sensors report new values.

```
\Box((acu && receive && msg_sensor_values) \rightarrow
```

```
\langle (acu \&\& send \&\& (msg_act_sb || msg_act_ab)) \rangle
```

Connected Requirements


R1.1.1 and R1.1.2 share input and output actions.





Block Library

Component interfaces are described by SysML Sequence Diagrams






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Introduction Scientific Context Contributions Conclusion and Perspectives L . . . Incremental Specification of CBS Architecture

Block Sensors







C. loop

[7] [true]




Block ACU





Promela code for ACU block





IA composition generated by Ptolemy (Lee et al. 2004)






Requirement Preservation over Composition

Theorem : Preservation of requirements


The composite block $S = B_i \parallel B_{i+1}$ preserves the requirements $\{R_i, R_{i+1}\}$ iff the interface automata A_i , and A_{i+1} , are compatible, and the input and output actions, I_i , I_{i+1} , O_i , and O_{i+1} are preserved in S.







Architecture Specification




BDD for the second iteration





Architecture Specification



IBD for the second iteration





Outline






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- 3 Contributions
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Contributions







Contributions

Formalize SysML

- Compatibility of SysML blocks
- Refinement of abstract SysML blocks

Verification of SysML Requirements

- SysML Requirements as LTL properties
- Promela description from SysML Sequence Diagrams
- Verification with SPIN model-checker


Incremental CBS Architecture Specification

- Guided by requirements
- Reuse of SysML blocks





Future Work







Future Work

Block adapters

Automatic generation of a block adapter when assembled blocks are incompatible

Non-functional requirements

Validation by simulation

Requirements when refining

Preservation over a decomposition

Toolchain for verification

SysML, SD to IA, SD to Promela, Ptolemy, MIO Workbench, SPIN, SysML Model





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Any questions?

Thank you

for your attention




Oscar Carrillo Formal and Incremental Verification... 54 / 54



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Final Architecture for the Vehicle Safety System




IA for the fourth iteration





Final Architecture for the Vehicle Safety System





Oscar Carrillo